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A BLUNDER OF SUPREME PROPORTIONS:
GENERAL JURISDICTION AFTER DAIMLER
AG V. BAUMAN
Kaitlin Hanigan
I. INTRODUCTION
As with all facets of the judicial process, personal jurisdiction
should be fair, uniform, and predictable.1 This fundamental doctrine
should not favor plaintiffs over defendants.2 Instead, personal
jurisdiction should provide nonresident defendants guidance on how
to avoid the reach of a foreign state.3 However, this doctrine should
also ensure plaintiffs a convenient forum without undue burden or
delay. Despite the weight of these fundamental policy concerns, the
jurisprudence surrounding general jurisdiction remains rife with
ambiguity and inconsistency, even after the Supreme Court’s most
recent opinion in Daimler AG v. Bauman.4
Part II of this Comment discusses the factual background of
Daimler. Part III then examines the historical background of personal
jurisdiction, including the origins of general jurisdiction. Part IV
analyzes the Supreme Court’s interpretation of general jurisdiction
after Daimler. Part V presents the ramifications of Daimler. Finally,
 J.D. Candidate, May 2015, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. English Literature,
Stanford University, June 2012. Thank you to Professor Simona Grossi for her guidance and
feedback on this Comment. And thank you to the editors and staffers of the Loyola of Los
Angeles Law Review for their work on this Issue.
1. See generally Simona Grossi, Personal Jurisdiction: A Doctrinal Labyrinth with No
Boundaries, 47 AKRON L. REV. 617 (2014) (examining the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence and
the lower courts’ confusion, and suggesting a new rule based on connecting factors and
expectations).
2. See Patrick J. Borchers, One Step Forward and Two Back: Missed Opportunities in
Refining the United States Minimum Contacts Test and the European Union Brussels I
Regulation, 31 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 1–2 (2014).
3. See id. (“[A] foreign corporation that decides to make a significant sales effort in the
United States or the European Union (E.U.) should be able to know (or at least get reasonably
certain advice on) whether and to what extent those commercial activities expand the horizon of
forum choices in suits against them.”).
4. 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
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Part VI concludes that the Court should have avoided Daimler
altogether, and clarified the standard for general jurisdiction on a
more appropriate occasion.
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 2004, twenty-two individuals (“Plaintiffs”) filed suit in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of California.5
Plaintiffs alleged that Mercedes-Benz Argentina (MBA) had
collaborated with Argentinian state security forces to kidnap, detain,
torture, and kill Plaintiffs and their relatives during Argentina’s
“Dirty War.”6
Plaintiffs advanced claims under the Alien Tort Statute and the
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 as well as wrongful death and
intentional infliction of emotional distress claims.7 The complaint
described incidents that occurred in Gonzalez Catan, Argentina while
Plaintiffs worked at an MBA plant.8 Plaintiffs never alleged that
MBA’s “collaboration with the Argentinian authorities took place in
California or anywhere else in the United States.”9
In the complaint, Plaintiffs named one defendant,
DaimlerChrysler (“Daimler”).10 Daimler, a German public stock
company, manufactured Mercedes-Benz vehicles in Germany and
maintained its corporate headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany.11 After
“a merger in 1998, the American Chrysler Corporation became one
of [Daimler]’s wholly owned subsidiaries.”12 At the commencement
of the action, Daimler maintained “no offices or persistent operations
in California.”13 One of Daimler’s California contacts was its counsel
5. Id. at 751. One of the Plaintiffs was a resident of Argentina but a citizen of Chile. The
other twenty-one Plaintiffs were Argentinean citizens and residents. Id. at 750, n.1; see Suzanna
Sherry, Don’t Answer That! Why (and How) the Supreme Court Should Duck the Issue in
DaimlerChrysler v. Bauman, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 111, 112 (2013) (noting that the
Daimler Plaintiffs filed in California because the Ninth Circuit has a “reputation as one of the
most liberal and plaintiff-friendly courts in the nation”).
6. Sherry, supra note 5, at 111–12.
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012); Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 751.
8. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 751–52.
9. Id. at 752.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Todd W. Noelle, At Home in the Outer Limits: DaimlerChrysler v. Bauman and the
Bounds of General Personal Jurisdiction, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 17, 19
(2013), available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/djclpp_sidebar/105/ (internal citation
omitted).
13. Id.
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in San Francisco, hired to represent Daimler in several lawsuits
challenging the state’s clean air laws.14 Daimler also manufactured
products specifically tailored to California’s market and maintained a
listing on the Pacific Stock Exchange in San Francisco and a
corporate partnership with the California-based Global Nature
Fund.15
Plaintiffs sought to hold Daimler vicariously liable for the acts
of MBA, a subsidiary wholly owned by Daimler’s predecessor in
interest.16 However, Daimler moved to dismiss the action for lack of
personal jurisdiction.17 In opposing the motion, Plaintiffs submitted
declarations and exhibits, which attempted to establish Daimler’s
contacts in California.18 As an alternative, Plaintiffs urged the district
court to find jurisdiction by imputing Mercedes-Benz USA’s
(MBUSA’s) California contacts to Daimler.19
At the time Plaintiffs filed the complaint, Daimler exclusively
exported Mercedes-Benz automobiles to MBUSA, which then
distributed the cars to independent dealerships throughout the United
States.20 Although it maintained a principal place of business in New
Jersey and incorporated in Delaware, MBUSA operated multiple
facilities in California, “including a regional office in Costa Mesa, a
Vehicle Preparation Center in Carson, and a Classic Center in
Irvine.”21 Indeed, “MBUSA is the largest supplier of luxury vehicles
to the California market. In particular, over 10 % of all sales of new
vehicles in the United States take place in California, and MBUSA’s
California sales account for 2.4% of Daimler’s worldwide sales.”22
The district court granted Daimler’s motion to dismiss on the
ground that Daimler’s own California affiliations were insufficient to
support the exercise of general jurisdiction over the corporation.23
Additionally, the district court declined to attribute MBUSA’s
14. Bauman v. DaimlerChrylser AG, No. C-04-00194 RMW, 2005 WL 3157472, at *8
(N.D. Cal. 2005).
15. Id. at *7–8.
16. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 752.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. The “General Distributor Agreement” described MBUSA as an independent
contractor, as opposed to an “agent, partner, joint venturer or employee of” Daimler. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. “Plaintiffs have never attempted to fit this case into the specific jurisdiction
category.” Id. at 758.
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contacts to Daimler on an agency theory because Plaintiffs had failed
to demonstrate that MBUSA acted as Daimler’s agent.24
On appeal, Plaintiffs did not challenge the district court’s
holding that Daimler’s own California contacts were insufficient to
support the exercise of general jurisdiction.25 Instead, Plaintiffs
appealed whether MBUSA’s contacts with California could be
imputed on a general jurisdiction theory.26
Initially, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
judgment.27 Only addressing the question of agency, the Ninth
Circuit held that Plaintiffs had not adequately demonstrated an
agency relationship between MBUSA and Daimler.28 Judge
Reinhardt dissented, and argued that MBUSA and Daimler’s
relationship satisfied the agency test and “considerations of
reasonableness did not bar the exercise of personal jurisdiction.”29
After granting Plaintiffs’ petition for rehearing, however, “the
panel withdrew its initial opinion and replaced it with the one
provided by [Judge] Reinhardt.”30 The Ninth Circuit held that “at
least for the limited purpose of determining general jurisdiction,
MBUSA was [Daimler’s] agent.”31 In its conclusion, the Ninth
Circuit noted that the Supreme Court had moved away from
“mechanical tests that fail to take account of reality,” and pointed out
that corporations like Daimler establish subsidiaries like MBUSA for
the sole purpose of reaping the economic benefits of the American
marketplace without facing any jurisdictional consequences.32
According to Judge Reinhardt, “it would seem off, indeed, if the
manufacturer of Mercedes-Benz vehicles, which are sold in

24. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler AG, No. C-04-00194 RMW, 2005 WL 3157472, at *19–20
(N.D. Cal. 2005). The district court tentatively granted the motion to dismiss on November 22,
2005, but before making a final decision, ordered plaintiffs to undertake limited jurisdictional
discovery. Id. On February 12, 2007, the district court affirmed its tentative order to grant the
motion to dismiss because Daimler’s “contacts with California [were] not ‘systematic and
continuous.’” Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler AG, No. C-04-00194 RMW, 2007 WL 486389, at *2
(N.D. Cal. 2007).
25. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 758.
26. Id. at 753.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909, 931 (9th Cir. 2011).
32. Id.
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California in vast numbers . . . could not be required to appear in the
federal courts of that state.”33
The Supreme Court then granted certiorari to decide “whether,
consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Daimler was amenable to suit in California courts for
claims involving only foreign plaintiffs and conduct occurring
entirely abroad.”34 The Court held that Daimler was not amenable to
suit in California for injuries allegedly caused by MBA’s conduct in
Argentina.35
III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The standards applied to personal jurisdiction can be largely
attributed to United States Supreme Court decisions.36 The Court’s
jurisprudence has developed two categories under which jurisdiction
may be exercised: the traditional bases and the “minimum contacts”
test.37 In Pennoyer v. Neff,38 the Court recognized the traditional
bases of personal jurisdiction: domicile, voluntary appearance,
consent to process, and physical presence.39 Later, in International
Shoe Co. v. Washington,40 the Supreme Court developed the
minimum contacts test, holding that even if the defendant were not
physically present in the forum, he could still have “certain minimum
contacts . . . such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”41
International Shoe’s conception of “fair play and substantial justice”
presaged the later development of specific and general jurisdiction.
While the Court has often addressed specific jurisdiction, it has
only ever issued two opinions on general jurisdiction before granting

33. Id.
34. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 753.
35. Id. at 748. Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice
Roberts, and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, Alito, and Kagan joined. Id. at 750.
Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring only in judgment. Id.
36. Grossi, supra note 1, at 621.
37. Id.
38. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
39. See Grossi, supra note 1, at 621 (“The traditional bases of personal jurisdiction include
domicile, voluntary appearance, consent to service of process, and physical presence. Each of
these forms is consistent with the sovereignty principle announced in Pennoyer v. Neff.”) (citing
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877)).
40. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
41. Id. at 316 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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certiorari on Daimler: Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.42
and Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall.43 In Perkins, the
Court found the exercise of general jurisdiction proper over a
corporation’s president who had established an office in Ohio while
the Japanese occupied its corporate headquarters during World War
II.44 In Helicopteros, the Court precluded a Texas court from
exercising general jurisdiction over a helicopter supplier whose
Texas contacts consisted of depositing money in a Texas bank and
occasionally sending personnel to Texas for training.45
After remaining silent for a quarter century and only a month
after granting certiorari on Daimler, the Court issued its third opinion
on the subject in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations v. Brown.46
There, a unanimous Court set forth an “essentially at home” standard
by announcing that “[a] court may assert general jurisdiction over
foreign corporations . . . when their affiliations with the State . . .
render them essentially at home in the forum State.”47 While the
Goodyear court did introduce a new standard for general jurisdiction,
the Court did not entirely flesh out the concept. Goodyear did not
guide lower courts “tasked with determining the level of business
contacts that may subject a foreign corporation to a forum’s general
personal jurisdiction.”48 Goodyear suggested that a company could
be “essentially at home” outside of its state of incorporation or
principal place of business, but provided no example for lower
courts.49
42. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
43. 466 U.S. 408 (1984); see Borchers, supra note 2, at 10 (“From 1945 to 2011, the Court
issued only two opinions exploring the general jurisdiction side of the minimum contacts test.”).
44. Perkins, 342 U.S. at 437.
45. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 408.
46. 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011); see Borchers, supra note 2, at 2 (noting that the Supreme Court
had “remained silent on the contours of its ‘minimum contacts’ test for a quarter century”). In
2011, the Court agreed to hear two jurisdictional cases, J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro,
131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011), and Goodyear. In Nicastro, the Court “failed to produce a majority
opinion . . . [and] continued to remain hopelessly divided over the boundaries of so-called ‘stream
of commerce’ jurisdiction.” Borchers, supra note 2, at 2 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.
v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297–98 (1980)).
47. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851 (emphasis added). Notably, the Court issued Goodyear
after it had already granted certiorari on Daimler.
48. Danielle Tarin & Christopher Macchiaroli, Refining the Due-Process Contours of
General Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations, 11 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 49, 49 (2012).
49. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851. As a result, confusion as to the application of general
jurisdiction plagued most states. Tarin & Macchiaroli, supra note 48, at 58. Most often, courts
struggled in situations where large revenues represented only a small portion of a corporation’s
total revenue. Id. For example, the Ninth Circuit examined the volume of MBUSA’s sales in
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IV. REASONING OF THE COURT
In granting certiorari on Daimler, the Court attempted to further
define the contours of general jurisdiction by answering the openended questions posed by Goodyear. The Court initiated its analysis
by tracing the history and development of general jurisdiction.50 The
Court attributed the fundamental principles of personal jurisdiction to
International Shoe,51 and noted that after that case, specific
jurisdiction came to occupy center stage in the modern
jurisprudence.52 The Court acknowledged that after International
Shoe, it had only ever visited general jurisdiction in Perkins,
Helicopteros, and Goodyear, and as such, general jurisdiction
occupied a “less dominant place in the contemporary scheme.”53
Next, the Court addressed the Ninth Circuit’s imputation of
MBUSA’s contacts to Daimler.54 The Court dismissed the Ninth
Circuit’s analysis because it resulted in a “sprawling view of general
jurisdiction,” which the Court had previously rejected in Goodyear.55
The Court emphasized that Goodyear presented only a limited set of
circumstances that would render a defendant amenable to general
jurisdiction.56 The paradigmatic bases for general jurisdiction, as
established in Goodyear, include the corporation’s principal place of
business and its place of incorporation.57 However, the Court
emphasized that Goodyear did not hold that a corporation could only
be subject to general jurisdiction in a forum where it is incorporated
or has its principal place of business.58 Again, the Court opened the
door to a possibility outside of the paradigmatic bases, but did not
provide any guidance for lower courts. Instead, it merely reiterated
the Goodyear standard that the forum state should be equivalent to

California, which accounted for 2.4 percent of Daimler’s worldwide sales, and could not overlook
that nearly 50 percent of Daimler’s overall revenue originated in the United States. Bauman v.
DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909, 931 (9th Cir. 2011).
50. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 754 (2014).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 755.
53. Id. at 757–58.
54. Id. at 758–59.
55. Id. at 760.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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an individual’s domicile, one in which the corporation is fairly
regarded as “‘essentially at home.’”59
The Court then briefly turned to Daimler’s affiliations with
California and concluded that because neither Daimler nor MBUSA
were incorporated or maintained their principal places of business in
California, the exercise of general jurisdiction would not be proper.60
Justice Sotomayor criticized the majority’s analysis: “The problem,
the Court says, is not that Daimler’s contacts with California are too
few, but that its contacts with other forums are too many.”61 The
Court viewed Daimler’s California contacts in the context of
Daimler’s global operation.62 In doing so, the Court refined its
“essentially at home” standard into a proportionality test that
measures in-state contacts against the company’s out-of-state
contacts.63
Notably, the Court did not arrive at its conclusion after closely
scrutinizing Daimler or MBUSA’s contacts with California. Instead,
the Court overlooked the fact-intensive analysis required in
answering jurisdictional questions and hung its hat on policy. 64 The
Court turned to the transnational context of the dispute as a
justification for its holding.65 According to the Court, if Daimler’s
activities were sufficient for general jurisdiction, the “same global
reach would presumably be available in every other State in which
MBUSA’s sales [were] sizable.”66 The Court found such an
expansive view of general jurisdiction to be troublesome because of

59. Id. at 761 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tire Operations v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851
(2011)).
60. Id. at 761–62.
61. Id. at 764 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
62. Id. at 762, n.20 (majority opinion). The Court clarified that “[g]eneral jurisdiction
instead calls for an appraisal of a corporation’s activities in their entirety, nationwide and
worldwide. A corporation that operates in many places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of
them.” Id.
63. Id. at 762.
64. “The majority's decision is troubling all the more because the parties were not asked to
brief this issue.” Id. at 766 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). “At no point in Daimler’s petition for
certiorari did the company contend that, even if this attribution question were decided against it,
its contacts in California would still be insufficient to support general jurisdiction. The parties’
merit briefs . . . focused on the attribution-of-contacts question, addressing the reasonableness
inquiry (which had been litigated and decided below) in most of the space that remained.” Id. at
766.
65. Id. at 762 (majority opinion).
66. Id. at 761.
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the risks it posed to international comity.67 The Court noted that
“[o]ther nations do not share the uninhibited approach to personal
jurisdiction advanced by the [Ninth Circuit] in this case”.68 Such
“‘expansive views of general jurisdiction,’” the Court asserted, have
impeded international negotiations and foreign investment.69 The
Court compared the Ninth Circuit’s approach to the European
Union’s standard, which provides that a corporation may only be
sued in a nation in which it maintains its principal place of
business.70 The Court concluded that subjecting Daimler to general
jurisdiction would not accord with notions of “fair play and
substantial justice” in the transnational context.71
Justice Sotomayor concurred in the judgment alone.72 Justice
Sotomayor deemed the majority’s approach “wrong as a matter of
both process and substance.”73 She argued that the Court should have
decided the case on reasonableness grounds.74 According to Justice
Sotomayor, the Ninth Circuit’s holding could have been reversed
simply because “the case involve[d] foreign plaintiffs suing a foreign
defendant based on foreign conduct.”75
V. ANALYSIS
This part first explains that the Court should have avoided the
general jurisdiction inquiry altogether. It then examines how the
Court’s attempt at clarification resulted in an even more restrictive
interpretation of the doctrine. Next, it explains that the Daimler
opinion marks a shift away from concerns of fairness and
predictability—the very principles underpinning personal
jurisdiction—in favor of protecting big business from jurisdictional
vulnerability.

67. Id. at 763.
68. Id.
69. Id. (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 2,
2013 WL 3377321).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 763 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
73. Id. at 764.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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A. A New, More Restrictive Approach to General Jurisdiction
The Court should have denied certiorari on Daimler because
either granting or reversing the Ninth Circuit’s ruling had the
potential to “make very bad law.”76 Affirming the Ninth Circuit
would have greatly expanded the scope of general jurisdiction.
Plaintiffs relied on MBUSA’s California contacts because, although
MBA had connections to the alleged atrocities committed in
Argentina, it had no California contacts.77 If parent corporations
were subject to general jurisdiction due to subsidiary relationships
like the relationship between Daimler and MBUSA, the scope of
general jurisdiction would be seemingly limitless.78
In reversing the Ninth Circuit, Daimler further limits the
Goodyear standard for general jurisdiction. Although the Court did
not explicitly restrict the scope of general jurisdiction to the place of
incorporation or the principal place of business, Daimler presents a
significant obstacle for plaintiffs establishing general jurisdiction
outside of these two paradigmatic bases.79 The Court expressly
declined approving the exercise of general jurisdiction in all states
“in which a corporation engages in substantial, continuous and
systematic course of business.”80 Although the Court did not
preclude the rare instance in which a corporation may be “essentially
at home” outside of its place of incorporation or principal place of
business, Daimler seems to suggest that it should be viewed as a very
narrow exception to the general rule.81
Additionally, Daimler’s restrictive standard casts doubt on
Perkins, the Court’s textbook example of general jurisdiction.82
According to Justice Sotomayor, if the Court had applied its “newly
minted proportionality test,” Perkins would have “come out the other
way.”83 In Perkins, the Court found the exercise of general
jurisdiction to be proper even though the company was not
76. Sherry, supra note 5, at 111.
77. See id. at 114 (“MBA [had] connections to the atrocities but no connection to
California.”).
78. See id. at 114 (“If this combination of subsidiaries means that the parent corporation is
subject to general jurisdiction in California, then effectively every global corporation will be
subject to general jurisdiction in the United States for any of its activities worldwide.”).
79. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 773 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
80. Id. at 761 (majority opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted).
81. See id.
82. Id. at 769 n.8 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
83. Id.
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incorporated and did not maintain a principal place of business in
Ohio.84 There, the contacts included the corporate president keeping
files in his Ohio home, maintaining active bank accounts,
distributing salary checks, and hosting directors’ meetings.85 By the
time the suit had commenced, the company had actually resumed
operations in the Philippines.86 There, the Court did not look at the
company’s contacts in the Philippines, but instead, focused on its
Ohio contacts.87 “In light of these facts, it is all but impossible to
reconcile the result in Perkins with the proportionality test” that the
Court sets forth in Daimler.88 Even though the Court did not
explicitly overturn Perkins, its reasoning in Daimler undermines the
validity of Perkins, which previously served as the standard for
general jurisdiction outside the paradigmatic bases.89
B. The Lopsided Consequences Post-Daimler
The Court’s test breeds unfair results and undermines notions of
“fair play and substantial justice.”90 First, the majority’s approach
will lead to an expanded “scope of jurisdictional discovery.”91
Although the Court noted that its decision would not change the
scope of discovery, it is impossible to imagine how Daimler would
not result in increased jurisdictional discovery at the district court
level.92 Now, lower courts will need to identify the scope of a
company’s contacts in other forums in addition to its in-state
contacts.93 This increased jurisdictional burden on lower courts runs
afoul of the principle that simple jurisdictional rules ensure greater
predictability.94
Second, the new test makes individuals and small businesses
more amenable to suit than corporations that conduct substantially
84. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 448 (1952).
85. Id.
86. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 769 n.8 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
87. Perkins, 342 U.S. at 447–48.
88. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 769 n.8 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
89. Id.
90. See Grossi, supra note 1 (“[T]he fundamental principles are submerged beneath opaque
formulas that are both too broad and too narrow and all too often open to conflicting
interpretations and applications.”).
91. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 770 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
92. Id. at 762 n.20 (majority opinion).
93. Id. at 770 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
94. See Grossi, supra note 1 (“[A]t its heart, the law of personal jurisdiction is simple and
elegant.”).
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more business within a state.95 For example, an individual defendant,
whose only contact with the forum state is a “one-time visit[,] will be
subject to general jurisdiction if served with process during the
visit.”96 However, a large company that owns property, employs
workers, and conducts substantial business will be immune to suit
because it has greater contacts elsewhere.97 Similarly, a small
business will be amenable to suit in California for any cause of
action “even if the small business incorporates and sets up
headquarters elsewhere.”98 Unlike Daimler, the small business’
California sales will be considered substantial enough when viewed
in light of its entire operation.99 Such results seem unfair, especially
given the intimate link between personal jurisdiction and due process
rights.100
Third, Daimler presents a roadblock for plaintiffs deciding
where to file suit against both foreign and domestic corporations.
The Court’s approach shifts the risk of loss from corporations to the
individuals harmed by their actions.101 As Justice Sotomayor states in
her concurrence, “a parent whose child is maimed due to the
negligence of a foreign hotel owned by a multinational conglomerate
will [now] be unable to hold the hotel [accountable] in a single U.S.
court, even if the hotel has a massive presence in multiple States.”102
The majority’s approach in Daimler, Justice Sotomayor posited,
precludes such plaintiffs from seeking recourse anywhere in the
United States.103
Importantly, the principle announced in Daimler applies to U.S.
companies. Even though the present case involved foreign plaintiffs
and a foreign corporate defendant, the Court did not frame the issue
95. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 772–73 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
96. Id. at 772.
97. Id. at 773.
98. Id. at 772.
99. Id.
100. See Grossi, supra note 1 (“The importance of personal jurisdiction cannot be
overstated . . . [P]ersonal jurisdiction is deeply intertwined with the litigants’ due process rights.
Also, the outcome of cases is significantly influenced, if not entirely determined, by decisions on
jurisdiction and choice of law, with the latter often deeply influenced by the former.”).
101. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 773 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
102. Id. Similarly, a U.S. business that contracts with a “foreign country to sell its products to
a multinational company there may be unable to seek relief in any U.S. court if the multinational
company breaches the contract, even if that company has considerable operations in numerous
U.S. forums.” Id.
103. Id.
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as exclusively applicable to foreign corporations.104 As a result,
moving forward, the standard will also preclude general jurisdiction
over a U.S. company that maintains its principal place of business
and place of incorporation in another state.105 As indicated by Justice
Sotomayor’s example, the ramifications of Daimler will greatly
impact a plaintiff’s choice of and access to a convenient forum.
VI. CONCLUSION
In reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Court picked a poor platform
to clarify the Goodyear standard. Instead of refining its “essentially
at home” standard in a case that implicated transnational concerns,
the Court should have denied certiorari on Daimler AG v. Bauman
and avoided the general jurisdiction inquiry altogether. The Court’s
attempt to further elucidate Goodyear resulted in an even more
restrictive standard for general jurisdiction, which loses sight of the
“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”106

104. Id. at 773 n.12.
105. Id. Justice Sotomayor provided the example of “a General Motors autoworker who
retires to Florida.” Id. Under the new principle, he “would be unable to sue GM in [Florida] for
disabilities that develop[ed] from the retiree’s labor at a Michigan parts plant, even though GM
undertakes considerable business operations in Florida.” Id.
106. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
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